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Decision-making has a high practical relevance for daily performance. Its relation to other
cognitive abilities such as executive control and memory is not fully understood. Here we
asked whether training of either attentional filtering or memory storage would influence
decision-making as indexed by repetitive assessments of the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT).
The IGT was developed to assess and simulate real-life decision-making (Bechara et al.,
2005). In this task, participants gain or lose money by developing advantageous or
disadvantageous decision strategies. On five consecutive days we trained 29 healthy
young adults (20–30 years) either in working memory (WM) storage or attentional filtering
and measured their IGT scores after each training session. During memory training
(MT) subjects performed a computerized delayed match-to-sample task where two
displays of bars were presented in succession. During filter training (FT) participants
had to indicate whether two simultaneously presented displays of bars matched or not.
Whereas in MT the relevant target stimuli stood alone, in FT the targets were embedded
within irrelevant distractors (bars in a different color). All subjects within each group
improved their performance in the trained cognitive task. For the IGT, we observed
an increase over time in the amount of money gained in the FT group only. Decision-
making seems to be influenced more by training to filter out irrelevant distractors than by
training to store items in WM. Selective attention could be responsible for the previously
noted relationship between IGT performance and WM and is therefore more important
for enhancing efficiency in decision-making.
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INTRODUCTION
In everyday life we have to make decisions all the time. Successful decision-making requires the
ability to make decisions that are unpleasant at the moment, but are advantageous in the long run.
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) can be considered as a proxy to this real-life function. Performing
advantageously on this task depends on, as in real-life, dealing with uncertainty in a context
of punishment and reward (Brevers et al., 2013). The IGT was originally designed for patients
with lesions of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bechara et al., 1994, 1997). Subjects have to
pick cards from four different decks to maximize their monetary gain (Bechara et al., 1994). Of
these four decks, two decks offer the opportunity to obtain large gains but are also associated
with greater losses (disadvantageous: A and B), whereas the other two decks result in small wins
but also smaller losses (advantageous: C and D). The decks further differ in their payoff scheme.
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Decks A and C involve frequent losses; decks B and D
infrequent losses. Normal subjects develop a tendency towards
advantageous decisions and improve their performance after
picking up ∼100 cards (Overman and Pierce, 2013). The
behavior of choosing the cards depends on cognitive processes
and emotional states (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). The
somatic marker hypothesis assumes that decision processes are
influenced by emotion-based signals arising from the body to
guide human behavior (Damasio et al., 1991). Other studies
have suggested a stronger association with cognition and have
reported correlations with executive functions (working memory
(WM), inhibition, set-shifting) and intelligence (Webb et al.,
2014), but others do no support these findings (Toplak et al.,
2010).
The extent to which subjects are able to develop advantageous
decision strategies in the sequential learning task seems to be
related to WM. In a dual task, participants were not able to
develop implicit learning strategies under concurrent high WM
load. Their IGT performance was lower than with no/low WM
load (Cui et al., 2015). In the past few years, researchers have
tried to investigate individual differences in WM performance
and their relation to decision-making. Subjects with high WM
capacity develop a more advantageous strategy than those
with low WM capacity (Bagneux et al., 2013). However, the
results of studies concerning decision-making and its relation
to WM are very inconsistent. To resolve this discrepancy one
could ask whether cognitive load and the ability to inhibit
irrelevant information influence IGT performance. A recent
study investigated the cognitive load effects of divided and
full attention on deck selection in the IGT (Hawthorne and
Pierce, 2015). They found that a disadvantageous strategy in the
divided attention group and limited cognitive resources were
responsible for bad decisions. However, the role of attention in
decision-making has yet to be properly researched, especially
regarding individual differences in distractor inhibition abilities.
Gansler et al. (2011) modulated a structural equation model to
predict IGT performance. The authors showed that successful
IGT performance demands different cognitive functions, and the
prediction from attention was twice as strong as the prediction
from other executive functions.
The inconsistent results regarding the relationship between
WM and decision-making led us to the question whether a
third cognitive component could moderate the relation between
WM and the IGT. Based on the correlation between WM
updating tasks and decision-making (Achtziger et al., 2014), we
assumed that an attentional selection component inherent in
these updating tasks may be the reason for the close relation.
Another empirical evidence for this theory was the finding that
subjects with high WM capacity are better able to filter out
irrelevant items in a visual WM paradigm (Vogel et al., 2005).
The role of selective attention in WM was also emphasized
by other authors (Conway and Engle, 1996; Cowan, 1999)
and was confirmed by the finding of overlapping neuronal
correlates (Awh and Jonides, 2001; Awh et al., 2006). These
observations led us to ask whether selective attention is the
reason for the inconsistent results on the relation between WM
and decision making. In order to investigate the relation between
selective attention and decision making further, we employed a
cognitive training paradigm aimed at inducing transfer effects
from selective attention to decision making (Moreau et al.,
2016). We asked whether this selective attentional training would
influence IGT performance more than WM storage training.
So far, only emotion regulation strategies have been shown to
facilitate decision-making (Martin and Delgado, 2011). Here,
we designed a task that—like in memory updating—required
selective attention. We developed two variants of a difference
detection paradigm that stressed either memory storage or
selective attention demands. One group performed the selective
attention (filter) training, the other performed the memory
storage training. In a prior study (Schmicker et al., 2016),
we had compared transfer effects of both training regimes
on WM performance and observed stronger transfer effects
of the selective attention training program. We now asked
how the different trainings influenced IGT performance. We
assumed that training of the core function of selective attention
would enhance the tendency to make advantageous decisions
as indexed by higher IGT gains more than memory storage
training.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample
Twenty-nine young, healthy subjects (24.31 years ± 2.9,
15 female) took part in the study. All participants were right-
handed and had correct or corrected to normal vision. The
study protocol was approved by the ethics committee of the
University of Magdeburg (Germany). All subjects gave their
written informed consent in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki to participate in the study and were paid 100 € for
complete participation. In addition, they were paid an amount
of money that was calculated as the mean of the gain from
five IGT sessions (mean: 20.94 €; range: 14.20 €–29.90 €). The
participants were divided into two training groups: 15 subjects
(8 female) received the filter training (FT), and 14 subjects
(7 female) received the memory training (MT). The groups were
matched according to their age and performance in attention
and WM.
Design
During the training (training days 1–5; Monday to Friday), half
of the subjects received 60 min of memory storage training (MT),
while the other half trained selective attention by having to filter
out irrelevant stimuli for 60 min (FT). In the middle of each
training session, a break was used to present the IGT (Figure 1).
Experimental Tasks
Training
In MT (Figure 2A) participants had to compare two arrays
presented consecutively with a delay of 900–1400 ms at the
center of the screen. The arrays consisted of 4–6 horizontal
and vertical bars (1.43◦ × 0.29◦) of one color (either red or
green). They were shown after a black square-shaped cue had
been presented. The task was to decide whether there was a
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FIGURE 1 | Study design. Memory Training (MT) consists of trials with memory storage demand. Filter Training (FT) trials were designed to train selective attention.
The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) was performed during a break between the first and the second 100 trials.
bar direction change in one of the presented stimuli. Hence,
the MT training lacked the necessity to filter out irrelevant
distractors.
In FT participants had to compare two simultaneously
presented arrays of colored bars (Figure 2B). In these trials,
a red or green cue instructed them to compare either only
the red or green bars of the double array while ignoring bars
of the other color. The arrays consisted of 4–6 relevant bars
and the same amount of irrelevant distractors. All bar arrays
were presented within a 4◦ × 9.3◦ rectangle against a gray
background and were placed 1.79◦ to the right and left of the
central fixation cross. The participants were instructed to decide
whether the simultaneously presented arrays matched in terms
of the orientation of the bars in the relevant color. This condition
did not demand memory storage.
MT and FT subjects pressed one of two buttons to respond.
In half of the trials, the orientation of one target changed,
and in the other half of the trials, no orientation change
occurred. Seventy two trials of each were presented in each of
the three conditions. The different trials were randomized within
four blocks (runs) and presented in a counterbalanced order
across participants.
528 training trials were created for the training sessions. Every
daily session consisted of 200 training trials in a randomized
order. The trainings sessions becamemore difficult over the week
by successively increasing the number of presented bars within
one array (for more details, see Schmicker et al., 2016).
Iowa Gambling Task
Each of the training days included a short break after 100 training
trials in FT or MT. During this break all subjects performed
the IGT. Apart from our interest in the impact of our different
training protocols on decision-making, the IGT implementation
was also intended to keep our subjects motivated by providing
them with additional reward. The repeated application of the
IGT entails the possibility of practice effects within the IGT so
that improvements in IGT scores cannot be solely attributed
to transfer effects induced by FT or MT, respectively. Note,
however, that these practice effects cannot account for group
differences as the IGT assessment did not differ across groups.
Group differences, which were the main focus of this study,
must, therefore, be related to the different cognitive training
protocols. We used the computerized version of the original IGT,
which is identical to the reward structure and instructions of
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FIGURE 2 | Schematic design of the bar paradigm. (A) Subjects had to remember (MT) or (B) compare (FT) the direction of the bars in either the cued color (with
distractors) or independent from the color (without distractors).
the IGT established by Bechara et al. (1994) presented with the
Software Inquisit 4.0.8.01. Before the task every subject was given
a fictitious amount of money (20 Euro). Four card decks were
presented on the screen, and participants were instructed to select
a card by clicking with the mouse cursor on one of the decks to
increase their gain of money. Additional information occurred
at the bottom of the screen. The reward was reported in green
letters, the penalty in red letters, and the total score in a black
font. The obtained gain of money was paid out at the end of the
study.
Data Analysis
We analyzed correct answers and reaction times as outcomes for
the two training conditions in the bar paradigm. For IGT data,
we recorded the total gain of one session for each subject. First,
we examined the correlations of the IGT score (training day 1)
with correct answers in MT and FT. Second, we investigated the
training effects for both training groups and analyzed correct
answers and reaction times for the five training days using
one-way repeated measures ANOVA and t-tests for both groups.
Third, we compared the change in the IGT score of both
training groups together and separately in each group in one-way
repeated measures ANOVAs (with five levels), with group as the
between-subject factor. In addition, we performed paired t-tests
for each group comparing training day 1 and training day 5 with
a hypothesis defined a priori. Afterwards, the training success in
MT and FT was correlated to test if training success correlated
1http://www.millisecond.com
with IGT changes (day 5–day 1) for all subjects together and both
groups separately.
RESULTS
Cognitive Training Effects
To address the question whether FT and MT affected the
performance within the trained task, we analyzed performance
changes within the five training days. FT trials were more
difficult than MT trials (FT: 61.97% ± 2.19%, MT: 78.59%
±1.71%; t(1,28) = 10.15, p < 0.001). Performance in the trained
conditions increased for both groups (MT, FT) during the five
sessions (Figure 3). For both groups, we found a main effect of
training sessions in correct answers (MT: F(4,9) = 5.43, p = 0.017;
η2p = 0.707; FT: F(4,8) = 4.65, p = 0.031; η2p = 0.699) and reaction
times (MT: F(4,9) = 5.40, p = 0.017; η2p = 0.706; FT: F(4,8) = 4.63,
p = 0.031; η2p = 0.698). One-sample t-tests for day 1 and day
5 performances showed significant t-values (p < 0.05) for both.
Correct responses increased for all subjects (4.5% for MT, 7.8%
for FT), while reactions time decreased (61 ms for MT, 134 ms
for FT) during training.
IGT Changes during Cognitive Training
The main focus of this article is on how the two different training
protocols impacted decision-making performance. IGT scores
were repeatedly measured during the 5-session-training period
for both groups (see Figure 4 and Table 1). In a between-
subject ANOVA with five levels, no main or interaction effect
was observed for the factor group. Because of our a priori
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FIGURE 3 | Increase in working memory (WM; MT) and filtering (FT) training. Mean values and standard errors of correct responses (A) and reaction times
(B) are visualized.
FIGURE 4 | Increase in IGT gain during the training week. Mean values
and standard errors for all days (1–5) and both training groups (FT, MT) are
visualized. ∗p < 0.05.
defined hypotheses, we calculated ANOVAs for each group.
For the factor ‘‘days’’, no main effect was observed for the MT
group, but there was a main effect for the FT group (MT:
F(4,9) = 0.20, p = 0.661; η2p = 0.015; FT: F(4,8) = 6.90, p = 0.020;
η2p = 0.330). Subjects who had been trained on filtering out
distractors won 7.00 € (SD: 11.21 €) more in the last gambling
session (training day 5). MT subjects increased their winnings by
2.75 € (SD: 14.93). A one-sample t-test showed significant mean
differences for the FT group (t(1,14) = −2.42, p < 0.030) but no
significant increase for the MT group (t(1,13) = −0.69, p = 0.50).
Additionally, Cohen’s d was calculated. We found a large effect
size for the FT group and a small d for MT (see Table 1).
Performed t-tests for independent samples revealed
significant mean differences between the FT and MT group
on day 4 (t(1,27) = −2.14, p < 0.041). The FT group had a 5.24 €
higher gain than the MT group. For training day 5, a two-sample
t-test did not reach significance due to a higher variance in the
values, but Cohen’s d showed a moderate effect for both days.
All means, standard deviations and effect sizes are presented in
Table 1.
We did not find any correlations of the training success in FT
and MT with IGT changes.
DISCUSSION
The current study investigated the relationship between WM
storage, selective attention and decision-making by testing
whether training of either memory storage or attentional
filtering influences performance in the IGT. During training,
performance increased in the two trained tasks. Regarding IGT
performance, for the first three training days, there was no
difference between both training groups. Starting with training
day 4, moderate effect sizes reflect that subjects who received FT
made more advantageous decisions in the IGT than those in the
MT group. FT participants also won a significant higher amount
of money between day 1 and day 5 than MT participants, which
is emphasized by a strong effect size.
These findings suggest different impacts of the trained tasks
on decision-making in the IGT. During FT subjects learn to
ignore irrelevant items during the encoding process (Schmicker
et al., 2016). How does this capability induce effects on learning
in decision-making? Knowing that additional cognitive load
increases disadvantageous deck selection in the IGT (Hawthorne
and Pierce, 2015), the increased ability to filter out irrelevant
information after FT may have freed attentional resources for
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TABLE 1 | Mean gain in Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) over five training days.
MT FT
IGT training day Mean SD Mean SD FT-MT t p d
Day 1 1717 855 1846 623 128 −0.47 0.65 0.17
Day 2 2121 523 2186 718 65 −0.28 0.78 0.10
Day 3 1935 778 2023 941 87 −0.27 0.79 0.10
Day 4 1939 729 2463 585 524 −2.14 0.04∗ 0.79
Day 5 1992 937 2546 916 553 −1.61 0.12 0.59
Day 5–day 1 275 – – −0.69 0.50 0.31
Day 5–day 1 – 700 – −2.42 0.03∗ 0.89
Statistical results for t-values (t) and significance (p) for group mean differences between (FT-MT) and within (day 5–day 1) groups are reported. Means and
standard deviations are stated in €-cent. Significant differences are marked with a star. Cohen’s d was calculated with the standard formula using the pooled
standard deviations. Strong effect sizes are highlighted in bold type. Fourteen subjects received the memory training (MT), 15 participants were trained with the filter
training (FT).
goal-driven decisions in the IGT. Alternatively or in addition,
FT may have enhanced not only the top-down control of
distracting information but also that of emotions and effective
emotional control has been shown to favor advantageous
decisions in the IGT (Martin and Delgado, 2011). The sensory
marker hypothesis (Bechara and Damasio, 2005) claims that
prior emotional processes induced by gains or losses influence
implicit and explicit knowledge for advantageous decisions.
Assuming an attentional control mechanism for these sensory
markers, learning to filter out irrelevant information could
extend to the suppression of strong emotions (Brevers et al.,
2013) produced by salient bottom-up stimuli (high losses,
high gains). In turn, attention could be guided towards less
(emotionally) salient stimuli allowing for an advantageous
strategy during decision-making. Considering that successful
attentional filtering is associated with activity in posterior middle
frontal gyrus (McNab and Klingberg, 2008) and training of
attentional filtering enhances activity in this area (Schmicker
et al., 2016), one can assume that emotion-related neural signals
from the amygdala or thalamus (John et al., 2016) are better
controlled by this frontal region after FT. Therefore, learning to
inhibit emotions might favor more rational decisions. However,
a direct neural evidence for this assumed role of attentional
filtering in decision-making still needs to be provided and
future research should address whether learning to inhibit
distracting information extends to the successful suppression
of emotional salient stimuli resulting in advantageous decision-
making. Alternatively, the frontal activity observed in the cited
earlier studies and ascribed there to attentional control might
be related to motor imagery during the preparation of finger
movements for responding, especially as the activity increases
emerged in rather posterior, premotor areas (Hanakawa et al.,
2008).
Why did the MT group fail to show an increase in IGT
performance? First, our previous training study (Schmicker et al.,
2016) indicates that MT subjects do not effectively differentiate
between relevant and irrelevant information and, therefore,
store unnecessary content. Relating this inefficient strategy
to decision-making, subjects may have stored information or
emotional markers that were irrelevant for a gainful gambling
behavior. In other words, simply improving information storage
does not make decisions better.
Second, mood can modulate decision processes and,
therefore, IGT performance (Bagneux et al., 2013). Fatigue or
boredom induced by the less demanding MT tasks may have
made participants more susceptible to emotionally attributed
stimuli and to avoid them. Harm avoidance is a personality
trait that has been shown to cause an inability to filter out
irrelevant distractors (especially for emotion-attributed stimuli)
and could lead to disadvantageous behavior (Most et al., 2005).
Alternatively, the more effortful FT tasks might have simply
increased the arousal levels with which subjects addressed
the IGT. In contrast the easier MT task with its behavioral
ceiling effects may have not been challenging enough to induce
transfer effects. Future research should therefore make use of
a more challenging memory storage training, for example one
that includes constant updating processes. Finally, the lack of
a passive control group and the small sample size limits the
possibility to draw conclusions regarding possible unspecific
effects of the active interventions on IGT behavior. Therefore,
based on the present results we cannot specify further which
processes underlay the FT induced effects on the IGT.
In sum our results indicate that training of attentional control
entails better decisions in the IGT. Whether this finding relates
to decision-making in real-life has not yet to be shown. Also,
the link between the ability to inhibit emotional reactions
and to inhibit distracting information during decision-making
needs more elaboration. It would be interesting to investigate
neural correlates of FT in decision-making and whether the
effects can be transferred to IGT performance in independent
measurements and to decision-making in everyday life.
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